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The Jurisprudence of the Advisory
Opinion Process in Rhode Island
Mel A. Topf*

ITihere is not a state in the union where the [advisory opinion]
provisionprevails but not only the Supreme Court but every
other person who has an intimate knowledge of the workings
of that provision would wish it were not there.-'
INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion to the Governor 2 that affected their precedent set twenty-four years before in the adjudicated case, State
v. Holliday.3 The case required the state to appoint counsel for

indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors that carry a potential prison sentence exceeding six months, even if no prison sen-

tence is actually imposed. 4

In its advisory opinion the Rhode

Island Supreme Court concluded that the State is no longer re-

quired to provide counsel unless the judge actually intends to send
the defendant to prison.5 This advisory opinion reflects several
characteristics of Rhode Island's advisory opinion process. First,
the justices rendered their advice without a case before them.
* A.B. 1964, Long Island University; MA. 1965, New York University;,
Ph.D. 1969, Pennsylvania State University. I am very grateful to Rae B. Condon,
Esq., for her help and guidance; to Professor Robert H. Whorf of the Roger Williams University School of Law for his excellent suggestions; to Alyssa V. Boss,
Senior Articles Editor, whose skill and insight improved this article in countless
ways; and to Keith Hawkins of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford University, for leading me to the investigation of several issues dealt
with in this article.
1. Langer v. State, 284 N.W. 238, 251 (N.D. 1939).
2. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Appointed Counsel), 666 A.2d 813
(R.I. 1995).
3. 280 A.2d 333, 337-38 (R.I. 1971).
4. Id. at 333.
5. 666 A.2d at 816.
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Case or controversy requirements did not apply. Second, the ex
parte nature of advisory proceedings effectively excluded from the
process parties who may have been affected by the advice. Due
process did not not apply. Third, the issues brought before the justices were hypothetical. The doctrine of ripeness did not apply.
Fourth, the advice given appeared to reverse a precedent set in
1971, but in fact advisory opinions are not binding. Precedent did
not apply.
Other characteristics of the advisory process were apparent in
a 1990 advisory opinion to the House of Representatives. The issue
was whether the Governor may unilaterally reduce, impound or
withhold from distribution funds appropriated and designated by
the legislature as state aid to cities and towns. 6 The opinion
turned on interpretation of a statutory clause setting forth the conditions under which the Governor may decline to distribute funds. 7
The justices advised that the Governor may not hold back the appropriated funds. s This advisory opinion touched upon the question of when rendering advice is appropriate. First, the question
from the House was propounded while litigation was pending in
superior court based on precisely the same issues. Second, the
question affected only the Governor's duties, though the Governor
neither sought the advice nor asked the House to do so. Third, the
question had nothing to do with the constitutionality of pending
legislation. All three are inconsistent with the justices' standards
for issuing advice, which include refusing advice when litigation is
pending on the same issues, when one coordinate branch seeks advice for another, and when advice sought from the legislature is
not on the constitutionality of pending legislation.9 This is a reflection of the extent to which the justices may set standards at will
for refusing to give advice, for whatever reasons they choose. 10
The characteristics of Rhode Island's advisory process reflected in these two fairly typical opinions suggest that the process
deserves much more attention than the surprisingly little it has
6. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (Impoundment of
State Aid to Cities and Towns), 576 A.2d 1371 (MI. 1990).
7. MI. Gen. Laws § 35-3-16 (1984).
8. 576 A.2d at 1375.
9. See id. at 1372; id. at 1375-76 (Weisberger, J., dissenting).
10. In this opinion the justices waive several of their restrictions owing to the
"constitutional and public importance of the question," though they explain this
only by noting that the cities and towns rely on the funds. Id. at 1372.
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received." The advisory power is in discord with several fundamental principles of the American systems of law and governance,
such as case or controversy requirements, due process, the ripeness doctrine, and separation of powers. A further concern is that
the advice rendered is purportedly non-binding and the product of
non-judicial action, propositions frequently put forth by the justices and believed by almost no one else. These and other concerns
cast long shadows on the legitimacy of the advisory process and
hence on the court whose justices render the advice. This Article
deals with those concerns; it attempts to show why the justices of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court should not have advisory duties,
duties which the justices do not appear to want.'2
The Rhode Island justices have advisory power in common
with the justices of ten other states. 13 This Article will compare
the advisory process in these other states with the process in
Rhode Island, in part to provide context and background, but more
importantly, to show that the problems with the advisory process
are inherent in the process itself and not in anything unique to
Rhode Island. Debate over the issues challenging the legitimacy of
the process has extended over two centuries, touching most advisory states as well as the many states that, like the federal government, have rejected the process. What troubles the advisory
process in Rhode Island has done so in other states; they offer no
solutions to Rhode Island that would redeem an unwise and questionable practice.

11. There is no comprehensive study of Rhode Island's advisory process. No
law review article has been devoted solely or mainly to the subject until now.
12. The 1986 Rhode Island Constitutional Convention proposed abolishing the
constitution's advisory opinion clause in part because the duty of rendering advice
"is not viewed favorably by the Justices." Report of the Judicial Selection and
Discipline Committee, 25 (1986). The Convention's proposal to abolish the advisory opinion clause was grouped with three others as Resolution 86-00080-A and
brought to the voters as Ballot Question No. 2. Voters' Guide to Fourteen Ballot
Questions for Constitutional Revision, 7 (1986). The Question was defeated at the
polls. On the reluctance ofjustices with advisory power to exercise the power, see

infra Pert IH.A.
13. R.I. Const. art X, § 3. All current state advisory opinion clauses are set
forth in the appendix. See app. at 254-56.

210 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:207
.

ADVISORY OPINIONS iN THm FEDERAL AND STATE

Govcmirs

A.

FederalRejection of Advisory Opinions

The most enduring shadow over the advisory process is the rejection of advisory opinions at the federal level. Before 1793, the
practice had been common and generally accepted in both England
and America. The prevalent view under the new constitution was
that the President had the right to seek advice from the Supreme
Court. 14 In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson wrote the

Justices requesting advice regarding relations with France during
France's Revolutionary wars. Certain legal questions, Jefferson
wrote, had resulted in "much embarassment and difficulty" for the
President's administration.' 5 Chief Justice John Jay's response to
President Washington courteously but very firmly refused to
render the requested advice. The Court, explained Jay, considered
as decisive:
the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the
three departments of government. These being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court
of last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially deciding
the questions alluded to.16

It is a remarkable letter. It sets forth what is effectively the
controlling federal precedent on advisory opinions, virtually unchanged to this day, despite its being a letter and not a judicial
opinion. The Court, after all, was refusing to issue judicial opinions that simply render advice or that decline to do so. Despite the
letter form, Jay's refusal "established a tradition so firmly engrained in our constitutional law that the Court has never questioned and seldom bothered to discuss it in any detail."1 7 The
refusal also flew in the face of contrary centuries-old Anglo-Ameri14. Note, The Advisory Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court, 5 Fordham L.
Rev. 94, 102 (1936).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Supreme Court Justices (July 18,
1793), quoted in Robert P. Dahlquist, Advisory Opinions, ExtrajudicialActivity
and JudicialAdvocacy: A Historical Perspective, 14 Sw. U. L. Rev. 46, 59 (1983).
16. Letter from the Supreme Court Justices to President Washington (August
8, 1793), quoted in Dahlquist, supra note 15, at 60.
17. Patrick C. McKeever & Billy D. Perry, The Case for an Advisory Function
in the FederalJudiciary,50 Geo. L.J. 785, 803 (1962).
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can traditions and practice.' 8 The practice in England could be
traced as far back as records extend, at any rate, to the pre-Magna
Carta doctrine of the Crown as the source of law and justice.' 9 The
strength of advisory practice was evidenced by its survival despite
increasing criticism beginning in the seventeenth century, when
Lord Coke complained of its infringement on judicial independence, and continuing until the practice declined in the nineteenth
20
century.
In the United States, a constitutional provision giving the
Supreme Court advisory powers was debated at the 1787 Convention in Philadelphia. 2 ' The motive for the provision was the fear,
which was widely felt at the Convention, of an overly powerful legislature. Madison, for example, said that "[e]xperience in all the
States had evidenced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This is the real source of danger to
the American Constitution."2 2 Madison earlier proposed that the
other two branches join in a Council of Revision with power to review and revise acts of the legislature; he felt this would provide
"an additional check against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust
23
measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities."
Others at the Convention, while agreeing about the threat of "legislative usurpations," opposed the proposed council on separation
of powers grounds.2 A Though the proposal was put forth five times,
separation of powers concerns prevailed and it never passed.
Charles Pinckney proposed the provision giving the Supreme
Court advisory powers, using as a model the advisory clause that
18. For a fuller analysis of the 1793 correspondence, see F.R. Aumann, The
Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 Ohio St. L.J. 21, 36-40 (1937); Dahlquist, supra note 15, at 58-62; Albert R. Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in
State Government 57-59 (1918); John F. Hagemann, The Advisory Opinion in
South Dakota, 16 S.D. L. Rev. 291, 292-94 (1971).
19. McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 787.
20. See Stewart Jay, Servants of Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory Role of
Early English Judges, 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1994); see also Ellingwood, supra
note 18, at 1-30; Van Vechten Veeder, Advisory Opinionsof the Judges of England,
13 Harv. L. Rev. 358 (1900); E.C.S. Wade, Consultation of the Judiciary by the
Executive, 46 Law Q. Rev. 169 (1930).
21. See Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Advisory Opinions:A Wise Change for Louisiana and Its Judiciary?,38 Loy. L. Rev. 329, 333-34 (1992); Dablquist, supra note
15, at 57-58; Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 55-57; Note, supra note 14, at 101-02.
22. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 74 (Max Farrand ed., 1987).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 76 (quoting Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania).
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had been in the Massachusetts Constitution since 1780.25 This
proposal was sent to the Committee on Detail, never to return to
the floor. The record reveals nothing about "the maneuverings and
compromises which must have attended this abrupt termination of
26
the issue."
Absence of an advisory opinion clause notwithstanding, prior
to 1793 the new Supreme Court had issued advice apparently
without causing comment. In 1790, Washington wrote the Justices
inviting their opinions on the formation of the judiciary system, in
particular on the Justices' own duties as circuit riders. 2 7 The Justices responded, advising Washington that Congress's requirement
that they ride the circuit was constitutionally doubtful. 28 Still, the
"rather abrupt turnabout"29 in 1793 has held firm, though more
recently the Supreme Court has relied on the case or controversy
requirement more than separation of powers to support its ban on
advisory opinions. In a leading case, the Court held that Article III
limits the authority of the federal courts "to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."30 Supporting this
conclusion, the Court ruled that the United States had no interest
adverse to the claimants, 3 ' and therefore, any judgment "would be
no more than an expression of opinion on the validity of the acts in
32
question."
25. Calogero, supra note 21, at 334, 341; see Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 57.
26.

Note, supra note 14, at 102.

27. Letter, Washington to the Justices (April 3, 1790),

quoted in Dahlquist,

supra note 15, at 50-51.
28. Dahlquist, supra note 15, at 51-52.
29. Id. at 53.
30. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 363 (1911).
31. Id. at 361.
32. Id. at 362. More recent cases affirming the Supreme Court's broad disapproval of advisory opinions include, United States v. Fruehauf,365 U.S. 146 (1961),
and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The debate over providing the Supreme
Court with advisory powers has continued. E. F. Albertsworth is among those
favoring a constitutional amendment for this purpose in Advisory Functions in
FederalSupreme Court,23 Geo. L.J. 643 (1935). See also Paul C. Clovis & Clarence
M. Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 188 (1927); McKeever & Perry,
supra note 17; Note, supra note 14. Those opposing include, Aumann, supra note
18; Calogero, supra note 21; Lucilius A. Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2
Maine L. Rev. 1 (1908); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 1002 (1924); Robert H. Kennedy, Advisory Opinions: Cautions about NonJudicial Undertakings,23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 173, 182 (1989).
In the 1930s, four attempts were made in Congress to pass legislation requiring the Supreme Court to give advice, owing generally to the length of time be-
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Advisory Opinions and the State Supreme Courts

The long history of rejection of advisory opinions at the federal
level has not prevented the states from following their own
courses.3 3 Those courses vary greatly, but they have in common a

struggle with important doctrinal issues, especially separation of
powers, as well as a widespread and longstanding reluctance by
the justices to exercise advisory power. The states currently providing for supreme court advisory powers did so between 1780 and

1963; eight by constitutional provision,3 4 three by statute3 5 (oneOklahoma-limited the power to capital punishment cases), and
one merely out of "courtesy and respect."3 6 Ten other states have
rejected or abandoned the practice: Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio
and Vermont ruled the practice unconstitutional,3 7 the supreme
courts of five states where advisory opinions were issued by custom
abandoned the practice,3 8 and in Missouri the advisory opinion
tween passage of New Deal laws and Supreme Court reviews. One House bill
proposed a constitutional amendment authorizing either house to require advice
from the Court regarding any act passed by Congress. H.R.J. Res. 317, 74th Cong.
(1935), quoted in Dahlquist, supra note 15, at 71. A second, more stringent bill
proposed an amendment that would require the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of all acts of Congress within 60 days of passage. H.R.J. Res. 344,
74th Cong. (1935). None of the bills passed. McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at
801, review debates over purported damage done by the Supreme Court's delay in
ruling the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, see A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
unconstitutional, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
33. Ellingwood offers the most extensive treatment of advisory opinions in the
states, supra note 18, at 30-55. See also James B. Thayer, Advisory Opinions, in
Legal Essays 42-46 (1908); R.K. Hoffman, Why Not Advisory Opinionsfor Illinois?,
31 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 141, 143-45. There is no recent comprehensive survey of the
states' advisory powers.
34. Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island and South Dakota. See app. at 254-56. The texts of all current advisory opinion provisions are in the appendix.
35. Ala. Code § 12-2-10 (1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141(a) (1996); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1003 (West 1986); see app. at 254-56.
36. North Carolina. The "courtesy and respect" statement first appeared in
North Carolina's first advisory opinion. 31 N.C. 518 (1848).
37. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 90 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1936); In
the Matter of the Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78 (1865); State v.
Boughman, 38 Ohio 455 (1882); In re Opinion of the Justices, 64 A.2d 169 (Vt.
1949).
38. Reply of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly, 33
Conn. 586 (1867); In re Board of Purchase & Supplies for State Inst., 37 Neb. 425
(1893); In re Workmen's Compensation Fund v. State Indus. Conm'n, 119 N.E.
1027 (N.Y. 1918); In re Opinion of the Judges, 105 P. 325 (Okla. 1909). In Penn-
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provision in its 1865 constitution was omitted in its 1875 constitution. 39 The oldest and most influential of advisory clauses is that
of Massachusetts, which appeared in its constitution of 1780.40

Following the Massachusetts lead, three other New England states
adopted advisory provisions: New Hampshire in 1784, Maine
when it separated from Massachusetts in 1820, and Rhode Island
within its new *constitution in 1842. 4 1 Florida incorporated an advisory provision in its constitution in 1868, Colorado in 1876, and
South Dakota in 1889.42 Michigan, the only state to adopt a consti-

tutional advisory provision in the twentieth century, did so in
1963. 4 3 Three states provide their supreme courts with advisory

powers by statute: Delaware since 1852, Alabama since 1923, and
Oklahoma since 1958. 44 North Carolina's justices have issued advisories with neither constitutional nor statutory authority from
1848 to 1985; however, they have since changed this practice by
declining to issue them on separation of powers grounds. 4 5
C. Advisory Opinions in Rhode Island: The Chief Provisions
Rhode Island's advisory opinion clause, part of the state constitution since 1842, is similar to others in its brevity and relative
clarity. The clause's chief provisions include the following. First,
the Rhode Island advisory clause, like most others, clearly obligates the justices to issue advisories whenever requested, providing that the justices "shall give their written opinion." 4 6 The
sylvania, the practice fell into disuse; see Ellingwoood, supra note 18, at 64-65.
Ellingwood's statement that the North Carolina Supreme Court no longer issues
advisories, id. at 68-69, was not then accurate in 1918, though the court did announce it would stop in 1985. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
39. On the history of the Missouri advisory opinion clause, see Manley 0.
Hudson, Advisory Opinionsof Nationaland InternationalCourts, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
970, 978-82 (1924).
40. Mass. Const. pt. 11, ch. 3, art. 2; see app. at 255.
41. See app. at 254-56.
42. See app. at 254-56.
43. Mich. Const. art. Im, § 8; see app. at 255. Several writers reviewing state
advisory opinion practices fail to mention Michigan. See, e.g., Margaret M. Bledsoe, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina: 1947-1991, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1853
(1992); Hagemann, supra, note 18, at 307; T. Smiljanich, Advisory Opinions in
Florida:An Experiment in Intergovernmental Cooperation,24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 328,
328 (1972).
44. See app. at 254-56.
45. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 892 (N.C. 1985).
46. R I. Cost. art. X, § 3; see app. at 256.
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justices frequently affirm their obligation.4 7 Similarly, other
states emphasize that the requesting authority "may require" or
has "the authority to require" opinions of the justices. 48 Maine's
clause emphatically instructs the justices that they "shall be
obliged" to give advisories. 4 9 Only in Alabama and Michigan are
the requesting authorities permitted merely to "request" advice. 50
In light of the predominantly obligatory language, one of the most
significant changes in advisory opinion practice--"a most startling
development" 5 1-occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century when the justices in most advisory states, though not in
Rhode Island, began to claim that they were to be the sole judges of
what is an appropriate request for advice, and to assert a right to
52
refuse to issue advisory opinions.
Second, in Rhode Island, both the coordinate branches may request advisory opinions, though not jointly. Rhode Island's justices
will render advice only on the request of the Governor "or (not
and)" either house of the General Assembly. 53 Requests from
either house must be a "formal and collective action" by the house,
and not merely a request by some members to secure advice, 5 4 or
even by house leaders seeking advice. 5 5 Rhode Island is similar to
most advisory states in permitting both coordinate branches to
seek advice. The exceptions are Florida, Oklahoma and South Dakota, where only the Governor may seek advice. 56 Delaware does
not permit each house to request advice independently of the other,
requiring instead that an advisory opinion be requested by "a ma57
jority of the members elected to each house."
Third, all state advisory provisions place general limits on the
questions the justices may answer, and it is here that Rhode Is47. See, e.g., In re Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553 (R.I. 1961).

48. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141(a) (1996); Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. 3,art 2;
N.H. Const. pt. II,
art. 74; Okla. Stat. Ann_ tit, 22, § 1003 (West 1986); S.D. Const
art. V, § 5; see app. at 254-56.
49. See app. at 255.
50. The Alabama justices have explicitly ruled they are not required to give
advice. See, e.g., Opinion of the Clerk, 394 So. 2d 957 (Ala. 1981).
51. Hoffman supra note 33, at 149.
52. For an extensive discussion, see infra Part III.B.
53. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318 (PI. 1986).
54. 191 A. 259 (R.I. 1937).
55. 507 A.2d at 1318.
56. See app. at 254-56.
57. See app. at 254.
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land's clause is most distinctive. Rhode Island's provision is by far
the broadest in this respect, requiring only that the justices give
their opinions "upon any question of law."58 This may help explain
why Rhode Island was the last advisory state to impose restric-

tions on the types of questions it will answer. 5 9 In contrast, the
clauses in six states require that advice be limited to "important
questions of law" and "upon solemn occasions."6 0 The clauses of
Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Michigan restrict advisory opinions to constitutional questions, 6 1 and those of Delaware and Florida require that the constitutional question affect the duties of the
requesting authority. In South Dakota, where only the governor
may seek advice, the court is not limited to constitutional questions, but the "important questions of law" must involve the exer62
cise of executive power.
Fourth, Rhode Island's advisory clause specifies that it is the
"judges" of the supreme court who render advice. The advisory
provisions in seven other states are similar in this respect,
designating the "judges" or 'justices" as issuers of advisories. 6 3 In
contrast are the clauses of Colorado, Michigan and South Dakota,
which designate "the supreme court" as issuer.64 The distinction is
important and much discussed, regarding the question of the binding or non-binding nature of advisory opinions, and the judicial or
non-judicial character of the advisory opinion process. 65 For example, in Colorado and South Dakota the justices have been constrained to rule that advisory opinions are binding because the

58.

See app. at 256.

59. See infra Part 1.B.
60. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3; Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Mass. Const. pt. II, cli 3,
art. 2; Mich- Const. art. III, § 8; N.H. Const. pt. I, art 74; S.D. Const. art. V, § 5;
see app. at 254-56. Colorado specifies simply "important questions," omitting "of
law." Otherwise the two phrases are identical in all six states. Michigan is unique
in imposing a time restriction on advisories, so that requests must be on "the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date." Mich. Const. art. III, § 8.
61. See app. at 254-56.
62. See app. at 256.
63. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma and Rhode Island. See app. at 254-56.
64. See app. at 254-56.
65. See infra Part III.D.
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court, rather than the justices, is the designated advice-giver 66
notwithstanding the problem of how advice can be binding.
Fifth, in Rhode Island and most other advisory states the advisory opinion clauses are silent on whether briefs and argument are
permitted in advisory proceedings. The Rhode Island justices permit briefs and argument on an irregular basis.67 The advisory
opinion clauses in two other states, Alabama and Delaware, 68 provide that the justices may permit briefs and argument, and a third,
Florida, is the only advisory state where this is mandatory. 69
Finally, the advisory opinion clauses in Rhode Island and four
other states require that advisory opinions be in writing,70 though
that has long been the practice in all advisory states. Only Alabama's clause requires the requesting authority to put the questions in writing, though that too appears to be the longstanding
practice in all advisory states.

I.

ADVISORY OPINIONS: PRAGmATIC ADVANTAGES AND JUDicIAL
QUESTIONS

Proponents of the advisory opinion process offer several arguments in its favor, all demonstrably weak. Opponents of the process point to the extent the process lies outside important
constraints of the American judicial system. This section considers
each of these arguments.
A. PragmaticAdvantages
Proponents of advisory opinions have put forth a defense that
asserts the legitimacy and benefits of advisory opinions in non-judicial and utilitarian terms. This defense has always been most
frequently and forcefully employed by observers of the process,
though rarely by advisory justices themselves. The defense relies
on the modern legitimating values of efficiency, cost, problem solving, cooperation and speed, and accepts advisory opinions for their
66. In re Resolution Relating to Senate Bill No. 65, 21 P. 478 (Colo. 1889); In
re House Resolution No. 30, 72 N.W. 892 (S.D. 1897).
67. See Smiljanich, supra note 43, at 332.
68. See app. at 254.
69. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(c) ("[The justices] shall.... permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented.").
70. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware and Florida. See app. at 254-55.
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pragmatic value, as an instrument to prevent the harm owing to
the law's delay and expense.
Proponents see law as a means of laying down rules or norms
for regulating conduct. 7 1 Important to the success of law in this
respect is the ability of those subject to the law to obtain authoritative answers to the inevitable questions on the meaning of a given
law. 72 From this viewpoint one problem with the American judi-

cial system is that it has retained from British common law the
retrospective process of determining the law's meaning authoritatively. Before its meaning may become clear, a law typically must
be promulgated, then allegedly violated, tested at trial, appealed,
and perhaps appealed again. All future applications of that law
will rely on the clarification. This remedial concept of law requires
the judiciary to "stand mute in the face of an unconstitutional statute, ignoring its possible harm until a justiciable issue is
73
presented."
The advisory opinion process is put forth as corrective. Proponents of advisory opinions see the process as a form of preventative
jurisprudence, permitting those who make and execute the law to
become aware of constitutional difficulties and to be guided accordingly, before harm is done. 74 Proponents point to New Deal legislation; eleven acts were declared unconstitutional, from the
Economy Act of 1933 to the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935, including
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (N.I.R.A.). 75 Before
the United States Supreme Court ruled the N.I.RA_ unconstitutional7 6 over one thousand national and local authorities were created under the statute, and for some two years they administered
77
regulations with significant effects throughout the economy.

"Mhe whole fiasco could have been avoided had the federal
supreme court been empowered, or required, to first express an
71.

For two prominent treatments of law from this point of view, see H.L.A.

Hart, The Concept of Law (1976); Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State
(1949) (particularly "General Norms Created by Judicial Acts" at 149-53).
72. Joseph Jaconelli, HypotheticalDisputes,Moot Pointsof Law, andAdvisory
Opinions, 101 Law Q. Rev. 587, 589 (1985).

73. McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 785.
74. See, e.g., Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 254; Hoffman, supra note 33, at
141; McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 785, 794.
75. McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 800-01; see also Aumann, supranote
18, at 25-28; Hoffman, supra note 33, at 141-42.
76. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
77. McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 801.
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opinion on the constitutionality [of the N.I.R.A.] before it was imposed on a helpless public."78 Some advisory proponents, especially those writing in the 1930s, stress the inefficiency of
adversarial litigation, noting that it hinders the government's re79
sponse to social and economic needs.
Another value of advisory opinions, according to proponents, is
that they promote interdepartmental cooperation, which helps to
solve problems arising between the legislative and executive
branches, in particular, issues that may not by themselves be justiciable controversies.8 0 Some claim that the advisory process even
promotes harmony among the branches of government. 8 ' One benefit for contending coordinate branches is simply the availability of
82
a source of resolution both find acceptable.
The purported preventative and cooperative values of advisory
opinions, proponents say, lead to efficiency. Proponents point most
often and most strongly to the speed of the advisory process, especially in contrast to the slow and expensive pace of litigation. 3 Oliver P. Field, in his analysis of several states' advisory practices,
reported that the average time from request submission to justices'
response is about thirty days.84 This is in obvious contrast to the
years it may take to resolve doubts about the constitutionality of a
statute through litigation.
However, those who emphasize efficiency neglect costs. First,
the justices may not have sufficient time to develop the best advice.
In a 1940 advisory opinion, for example, the Rhode Island justices
commented that they received the question on the Saturday before
a Tuesday election day, and if the advice was to be useful they
would have to answer that same day. a s Second, claims to greater
speed and lower costs for resolving constitutional questions as78. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 141.
79. Note, supra note 14, at 109.
80. Calogero, supra note 21, at 359; Smiljanich, supra note 43, at 338-39.
81. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 252; McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at
792.
82. Charles M. Carberry, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective,44 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 105 (1975).
83. See, eg, Albertsworth, supra note 32, at 669; Ellingwood, supranote 18, at
251; Jaconelli, supra note 72, at 599; McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 793.
84. Oliver P. Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 203,
216 (1949).
85. In re Opinion of the Justices, 16 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1940). A Massachusetts
justice complained in 1781 that he "could have wished that a longer space than two
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sume that the justices' answers resolve doubts indefinitely. But
the abstract and general nature of the questions propounded and
the advice given is unlikely to deal adequately with changing reality. At any rate, as Justice Frankurter said, constitutionality is
not a fixed quality.86 Finally, delay between passage of a law and
judicial review of it may have political value.8 7
The cooperation argument passes off its dangers. It presumes
that separation of powers is successful only when the departments
are "working in harmony towards a common end."8 8 This presupposes a view of government as a corporation, where cooperation is
a prerequisite to rational efficiency and efficiency is a means to
productivity. Separation of powers, however, presumes the contrary: that the branches in close harmony are a danger. Madison
described separation of powers as a protection against the "dangerous tendency" to the accumulation and concentration of power.
That tendency necessitates a defense that "must be commensurate
to the danger of the attack."8 9 This is not the language of harmony
or efficiency. The advisory process tends to place the judiciary in
collusion with one or both of the coordinate branches to help them
deal with what are often political matters sent to the justices to
avoid the debate and deliberations that, in a democracy, are public,
heated, often messy, and inconvenient to those in power.
B.

Judicial Questions

Whatever the pragmatic value of the advisory process, the
mandatory force and unusual breadth of Rhode Island's advisory
opinion clause serve to highlight several jurisprudential issues
burdening advisory justices. These issues arise from the extent to
which the advisory opinion process is free of the constraints of important doctrinal safeguards inherent in the American judicial system. In a constitutional system characterized by constraints, the
days had been allowed me," quoted in Note, Duty of the Court to Give Advisory
Opinions, 2 Mass. L. Q. 542, 543 (1917).
86. Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1002; see also Aumann, supra note 18, at
42-43.
87. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 179. On the potential for the advisory process
to cut short political processes, see infra Part II.B.2.
88. Ellingwood, supranote 18, at 252.
89. The Federalist No. 47, at 301, No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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advisory process stands disturbingly removed from too many of
them.
1. Separation of Powers
Perhaps most formidably, the advisory process is challenged
by the separation of powers doctrine. This has been a persistent
argument against the process since Chief Justice Jay's letter of
1793, and reasserted continually by the Supreme Court, as for example, where the Court held that "the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by the
Constitution." 90
This shadow over the advisory process is lengthened by the
many states that have rejected it predominantly on separation of
powers grounds.9 ' Supreme courts in states with advisory statutes, for example, have, with three exceptions, ruled the statutes
unconstitutional as violations of separation of powers. 92 The Minnesota supreme court was typical in this regard when it ruled in
1865 that an advisory opinion statute violated separation of powers principles, any departure from which "must be attended with
evil."9 3 The Ohio Supreme Court similarly declared in 1882 that
advice to the legislature would be "an unwarranted interference
with the functions of the legislative department that would be...
dangerous in its tendency."9 4 Outside observers opposing the advisory opinion process have relied heavily on separation of powers;9 5
and those defending advisories invariably contend with the separation of powers issue, the defenders arguing chiefly that advisory
opinions are non-binding in nature. 9 6 Though in most advisory
90. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
91. See supra Part LB.
92. The supreme courts of Alabama and Delaware have ruled their respective
state's advisory opinion statutes constitutional. 96 So. 487 (Ala. 1923); 88 A.2d
128 (Del. 1952). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the state's advisory opinion statute. The statute permits advisories only
regarding convictions requiring death sentences. See app. at 255-56.
93. In the Matter of the Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78, 79 (1865); see,
e.g., In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 90 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1936); In re
Constitutionality of House Bill No. 88, 64 A.2d 169 (Vt. 1949).
94. State v. Boughman, 38 Ohio 455, 459 (1882).
95. See, eg., Bledsoe, supranote 43, at 1853, 1896; Calogero, supra note 21, at
362, 382; Emery, supra note 32, at 1; Kennedy, supranote 32, at 194-96.
96. See, e.g., Clovis & Updegraff, supra note 32, at 196-97; Hugo A. Dubuque,
The Duty of Judges as ConstitutionalAdvisors, 34 Am. L. Rev. 369, 397 (1890);
Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 250-52; McKeever & Perry, supranote 17, at 810-12;
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states the advisory power derives from the constitution, this does
not neutralize the separation of powers issue. The Rhode Island
justices explain their policy of strict intepretation of the advisory
opinion clause as necessary to legitimize advisories in view of "the
obvious repugnance" of the advisory clause to the principle of sepa97
ration of powers.
A related issue arises from the mandatory nature of the advisory duty,98 noted as long ago as 1896 as perhaps "the most cogent
objection to the practice." 9 9 Some see the effect of the justices' loss
of control over their own advice, absent controlling restrictions, as
a weakening of judicial independence. Justices for example may
find themselves "participating in a realignment of governmental
power by being compelled by the executive branch to review the
work of the legislative branch." 10 0 This has been mitigated to some
extent by the advisory justices having gradually taken upon themselves the right to refuse advisory requests. 01 ' However, the
Rhode Island justices have by now repeatedly affirmed their obligation to respond, as long as they view the question propounded as
02
falling within the purview of the advisory opinion clause.'

Note, supra note 14, at 105. The purportedly non-binding nature of advisory opinions is treated infra Part M.D.
97. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (RI. 1963); see In re Opinion to
the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1965) (declining to render
advice since answering the question propounded would be an "undue expansion7 of
the narrow purpose of the advisory opinion clause by "judicial fiat on the constitutional separation of powers of government"); see also Answer of the Justices to the
Council, 291 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Mass. 1973) (The Massachusetts advisory opinion
clause "must be strictly construed in order to preserve separation of judicial from
executive and legislative branches of government.").
98. See supra pp. 214-15.
99. Note, Extra-JudicialOpinions, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1896).
100. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 180.
101. See infra Part II.B. While some observers question the advisory justices'
authority to refuse to render advice, see Hoffman, supra note 33, at 149-50, others,
like Kennedy, call it "uniquely important that the judges retain [this] moral and
institutional" authority. Kennedy, supra note 30, at 180.
102. See, e.g., Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611 (RI. 1963); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 483 A.2d 1078 (R.I. 1984).
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The PoliticalProcess:JudicialEncroachment on Legislative
and Public Debate

The advisory process, some say, engages the justices in policy
and politics, 103 creating the danger of weakened public confidence
in judicial disinterestedness and independence.10 4 In addition, the
process impinges on the central political activity of legislative and
public debate. "Perhaps the most costly price of advisory opinions,"
according to Justice Frankfurter, "is the weakening of legislative
and popular responsibility." 10 5 For one thing, the legislature loses
opportunities inherent in the "beneficent ordeal" of debate and negotiation with a resulting diminution of a sense of responsibility.10 6 The very availablity of the advisory process invites the
legislature to surrender their obligation to independently assess
the constitutionality of a pending statute 0 7 and also invites the
executive to avoid assessing the constitutionality of its acts.' 0 8 "It
is not unknown for legislatures to abdicate their duty to act constitutionally in reliance upon eventual judicial review. Advisory
opinions facilitate this abdication."' 09
In addition, the advisory process tends to diminish the civic
discourse essential to the political economy of a republic. This consequently dwarfs the political capacity of the people and deadens
their sense of moral responsibility." 0 The advisory process has a
depoliticizing effect, withdrawing public questions from the political realm to the isolated realm of the justices, in which they are
required to stay by virtue of their disinterestedness. There the justices are at least formally unaffected by the various and unpredictable sources of public opinion and information endlessly impinging
103. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 194; see also Calogero, supra note 21, at 367;
Clovis & Updegraff, supra note 32, at 196; Dubuque, supra note 96, at 393 (citing
the Massachusetts 1853 Constitutional Convention's attempt to delete the advisory opinion provision, fearing that justices might be drawn "into the vortex of
politics").
104. Aumarm, supra note 18, at 194; Calogero, supra note 21, at 367; Preston
W. Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C. L. Rev. 297, 333
(1949); Hagemann, supra note 18, at 295.
105. Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1007.
106. Aumann, supra note 18, at 48.
107. Calogero, supra note 21, at 363.
108. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 190 n.54.
109. Id.
110. James B. Thayer, Life of John Marshall 103-110, quoted in Frankfurter,

supra note 32, at 1007.
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on the legislative process. The advisory process relies on the "wise
man" technique of government with its concomitant temptation to
avoid the conflicts, ambiguities and uncertainties of the democratic
political process."" If advisory opinions were not available, "legislative and executive officials would be forced to face up to constitutional questions and take responsibility for the initial decisions on
these questions, thereby giving at least some measure of evidence.
as to what the public understands the constitution to mean."1 2
3.

The Case or Controversy Requirement

The advisory opinion process is an exception to a doctrine that
further troubles the advisory process and distinguishes advisory
opinions from adjudicated opinions-the case or controversy requirement. 1 3 One basis for the United States Supreme Court's rejection of advisories is that they tend to be "upon issues which
remain unfocused because they are not pressed before the Court
with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation
114
embracing conflicting and demanding interests."
The ex parte character of the advisory process puts it outside
the core legal premise that the judiciary should not offer an opinion
on an issue until it is before the court in an adversarial proceeding.
The focus of the adversarial system is what a former Maine Chief
Justice called, in 1908, "the shock of contention by adverse parties
that lights the torch of truth. It is when every argument advanced,
and every authority cited, is assailed by opposing counsel that the
true reason and rule are most likely to be found. " 11 5 The absence
in the advisory process, not only of opposing parties before the justices, but also of lower court opinions, themselves a product of ad111. C. Dallas Sands, Government by Judiciary-Advisory Opinions in Alabama, 4 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1951).
112. Id. at 38.
113. On the absence of the correlative practice of arguments and briefs in advisory proceedings, see infra Part III.B.5. At the 1986 Rhode Island Constitutional
Convention, the lack of opposing arguments and lack of briefs were frequently
cited as reasons to remove the advisory opinion clause. Judicial Selection and Discipline Committee, Minutes (May 21, 1986); Report of the Judicial Selection and
Discipline Committee, Minutes (May 29, 1986); Convention Proceedings (June 4,
1986).
114. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
115. Emery, supra note 32, at 3.
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increases the likelihood

of error by the

4. Facts
An important consequence of the absence of adversarial proceedings in the advisory opinion process is that the justices act
outside the context provided by full factual development. 1 7 Facts,
as Justice Frankfurter said, are decisive; without them advisory
opinions are rendered in an abstract universe of sterile legal questions "bound to result in sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."" 8 It is the frame of claim and counterclaim, "a proposition
on one side denied on the other," 1 s that makes judicial facts facts
in the adversarial system. In this system, where judgment is required "only when an affirmative is met by a negative," a conflict of
views represents a means of discovering facts. 120 One consequence
to the advisory process noted by Massachusetts's Chief Justice is
that there is no assurance that either the question propounded or
the advice rendered reaches all issues or resolves all potential conflicts relating to the issues.1 2 1 In other words, in an adversarial
case a court relies on the core adjudicative acts of challenge and
116. Smiljanich, supranote 43, at 337. On the mncreased likelihood of error, see
also Calogero, supranote 21, at 366; Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1006; Kennedy,
supranote 32, at 186 n.42; Sands, supra note 111, at 31; Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev.
772, 773 (1955).
117. The factual vacuum of the advisory process was emphasized at the 1986
Rhode Island Constitutional Convention: "[The lack of factual information which
would arise in an actual case or controversy, make[s] it difficult for justices to give
these matters the deliberation they deserve." Report of the Judicial Selection and
Discipline Committee, Minutes at 32 (May 29, 1986); see also id. at 1; Convention
Proceedings at 127 (June 4, 1986).
118. Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 1005; see also Aumann, supra note 18, at
44; Calogero, supra note 21, at 364. The Maine justices have remarked on the
"extraordinary responsibility of rendering their opinions outside the context of any
concrete, fully developed factual situation and without the benefits of adversary
evidentiary legal presentations." Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court
Given Under the Provisions of Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, 460 A.2d
1341, 1345-46 (Me. 1982).
119. Hector L. MacQueen, PleadableBrieves, Pleading,and the Development of
Scots Law, 4 Law & Hist. Rev. 403, 413 (1986). On the historically central role of
adversarial fact, see also S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common
Law 42 (1981).
120. Alessandro Guiliani, The Influence ofRhetoric on the Law of Evidence and
Pleading,7 Jurid. Rev. 216, 229 (1962).
121. Letter from Massachusetts Chief Justice Paul J. Liacos to Louisiana Chief
Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. (May 17, 1991) (copy on file with author).
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response, claim and denial, for its "finding" of facts. These adjudicated facts are judicially real in contrast to the abstract facts
merely offered ex parte by those seeking advisory opinions. The
facts offered before advisory justices remain "non-adjudicatory, hypothetical and prospective." 122
In this respect advisory opinions lie outside another judicial
doctrine closely related to case or controversy as well as to fact requirements-ripeness. 123 The unripe, abstract and prospective
nature of requests for advice contributes to overly broad opinions
that do "implicitly what courts are forbidden to do explicitly;
namely, . . . resolve[] the legal merits of questions not actually
posed and which therefore need not be decided." 2 4 The Rhode Island justices have created a restriction against unspecific and
overly broad questions 12 5 that appears to be in part a bar to advice
on unripe issues.
5.

Briefs and Arguments

Another way the advisory process lies outside judicial procedure is that opinions need not be briefed or argued by interested
parties.' 2 6 Typically the letter from the requesting authority may
be the sole source of relevant information. Since the justices usually lack the resources and procedures to secure relevant information, 2 7 they arrive at conclusions only after consulting among
28
themselves.'
122. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 192.
123. The United States Supreme Court has indicated the origin of ripeness in
article III case or controversy requirements, see, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 59, 81 (1978), and has viewed ripeness in part as a
requirement that decisions not be handed down until facts are alleged adequate to
a precise resolution of the issue, Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325

U.S. 450, 461 (1945).
124.

Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article IH: Perspectiveson the 'Case

or Controversy" Requirement, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 303 (1979).
125. See infra p. 239.
126. See supra p. 217. Only the Florida advisory clause requires that the justices permit interested parties to be heard. See app. at 254-55.

127. Calogero, supra note 21, at 365; see also Hagemann, supra note 18, at 296;
Note, supra note 99, at 50.
128. Aumaun, supra note 18, at 47; Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1302, 1309 (1956). Advisory justices have
long commented on this. See, e.g., Reply of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the
General Assembly, 33 Conn. 586 (1867) (advice refused, in part for lack of briefs
and argument); Opinion of the Justices, 21 N.E. 439 (Mass. 1889); In re Law School
Manual, 4 A. 878 (N.H. 1885). The 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Conven-
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However, advisory justices have increasingly permitted briefs
and arguments whether or not their respective advisory clauses
provide for it.129 This raises its own problems. First, sole discre-

tion to allow participation by interested parties in most advisory
states remains with the justices. Second, even when outside participation is permitted, it is possible only after the question has
been already accepted by the justices; threshold jurisdictional
questions cannot be raised. 1 30 Third, participation is hampered by
the short amount of time typical of the advisory process. Fourth,
there is no clear procedure for identifying interested parties, much
less notifying them. 3 ' This may lead to concerns among the justices about due process infringements, which could impel them to
restrict advisories to broad and general public issues, making it all
the more difficult to identify parties with a sufficient stake in the
issue to effectively argue on it.132 Fifth, briefs and arguments in
advisory proceedings blur the "already imprecise distinction between decisions of the court and opinions of the justices."13 3 Finally, briefs and arguments under advisory procedures may not be
of the same quality as in adjudications. Massachusetts Chief Justice Liacos observes that a briefing from an interested party in an
advisory opinion proceeding "sometimes is not so effective or so
well-focused as that which follows thorough examination of the issues through the trial process."3- 4
6. Due Process
The ex parte character of advisory proceedings raises due process questions since the proceedings exclude a hearing by parties
who may be affected by the action of the requesting authority relytion's judiciary committee, in its report recommending abolition of the advisory
clause, said the questions propounded "must almost inevitably be decided without
the important benefit of an argument," quoted in Dubuque, supra note 96, at 39192. The same point was made at the 1986 Rhode Island Constitutional Convention. See supra note 113.
129. Calogero, supra note 21, at 348.
130. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 185.
131. Id. at 192; Calogero, supra note 21, at 348.
132. Calogero, supra note 21, at 349.
133. Carberry, supra note 82, at 101. On the tendency of advisory procedures
and advisory opinions themselves to take on the traits of adjudications, see infra
Part I.E.
134. Letter from Massachusetts Chief Justice Paul J. Liacos to Louisiana Chief
Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. (May 17, 1991) (copy on file with author).
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ing on the advice.' 3 5 Further, advisory proceedings are prospecfive, and as such they "might foreclose issues on which interested
parties in future litigation would not have had full opportunity to
be heard."' 3 6 Although advisory justices have increasingly permitted briefs and argument, except in Florida, decisions as to who
may submit briefs, when they may be submitted, how many may
be submitted, and whether they may be submitted at all, remain
wholly at the discretion of the justices.
Partly to mitigate this, all advisory states have restricted advi37
sory requests that affect private rights or pending litigation.'
For example, the Colorado justices' ban on advisories on issues
pending in litigation is in part for the protection of interested parties' "opportunity of presenting their causes to court."'

38

A diffi-

culty here is that nearly every official action can reasonably be
expected eventually to affect some private right, so that a ban on
advice affecting private rights, if followed with rigor, could pre39
clude nearly all advisory opinions.'
7.

Justices Prejudicedby Advisory Proceedings

Justices may be prejudiced by their advisory opinions if the
same issues come before them in an adjudicated case. There is risk
of the justices being "insensibly biased" by their earlier conclusions
in advisory opinions, since the justices may be slow to overcome
the pride of first conviction and admit the need to change their
views.' 40 Even if the advice were incorrect, the justices might be
slower to see error in their own work than in that of others.' 4 '
Advisory justices themselves are aware of the problem. This
was one of the objections of the Rhode Island justices to their advisory duty that was reported to the 1986. state Constitutional Convention: "Once an advisory opinion is issued, it becomes very
difficult [for the justices] to reconsider an issue and decide it differ135. Carberry, supranote 82, at 101; Note, supranote 99, at 50; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Powers of the Judiciary-Obligationof Courts to Give Advisory Opinions, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1912).
136. Carberry, supranote 82, at 101.
137. On such restrictions in Rhode Island, see infra p. 236-37.
138. In re Interrogatories by the Governor, 245 P.2d 1173 (Colo. 1952).
139. Sands, supra note 111, at 24.
140. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 254-55.
141. Edsall, supra note 104, at 332; see also Sands, supra note 111, at 26.
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ently, in light of an actual factual situation."14 2 The Massachusetts justices have referred to their duty to "guard against" any
influence of earlier advisory opinions while considering an adjudicated case; 143 and two Alabama justices, declining to join their five
brethren who airmed the constitutionality of rendering advice
under the state's advisory opinion statute, said that rendering advice "will constitute a moral obstacle.., to stand in the way of a
free and unbiased decision should the question now propounded
hereafter recur in the course of litigation the court will be bound to
decide." 144 A further problem in Rhode Island is that while the
justices may seek to "guard against" any influence of earlier advice
on later decisions, they in fact freely cite their advisory opinions in
support of their decisions in adjudicated opinions. 145

M.

JUDmIciAL RESPONSES TO DocTRIwAL Dm'icUmTms

Given the constitutional or statutory authority to participate,
the threshold issue for any advisory court will be whether the
judges ought to accept an invitation to provide counsel to another branch. That decision-to become engaged or to decline-is the most important decision for the governmental
146
system.
Advisory justices have responded in various ways to the doctrinal difficulties discussed above. Generally, in states without a constitutional mandate to issue advice the respective justices have
refused to do so.1 4 In most states with advisory opinion provisions
the justices have openly expressed their reluctance to render advice. In all advisory states, the justices have imposed rules sharply
restricting when they will render advice even when the state's advisory opinion clause contains clear and unqualified obligatory language, as does Rhode Island's clause. This section briefly reviews
the nature of the refusals and the depth of the reluctance, followed
142. Report of the Judicial Selection and Discipline Committee, Minutes (May
21, 1986).
143.

Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank,

249 N.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1969).
144. In re Opinions of the Justices in re Amendment to Section 93 of the Constitution, 96 So. 487, 498 (Ala. 1923).
145. See infra pp. 246-47.

146. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 184.
147. The exceptions are Alabama, Delaware and Oklahoma, where advisory
opinion authority is provided by statute. See app. at 254-56.
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by an analysis of the chief restrictions imposed by Rhode Island's
justices and the rationale behind them.
A. Refusals and Reluctance to Issue Advisory Opinions
State supreme courts not compelled to give advice by their constitutions have tended to reject advisory opinion requests. Similarly, with three exceptions, 148 every supreme court confronted
with the issue has ruled statutes creating advisory power to be unconstitutional. Some supreme courts have rejected advisories im149
mediately, some after issuing them for some time.
Supreme court justices with advisory duties have freely expressed their reluctance to perform the duties. Delegates to the
1986 Rhode Island Constitutional Convention learned that former
and present Rhode Island Supreme Court justices "reported that
this obligation ... is not viewed favorably by the Justices," and
that several justices "spoke out in opposition" to the advisory process. 150 It has long been the same in other advisory states, as observers have been pointing out for the past century. A writer in
1896 noted the "extreme reluctance" with which the Massachusetts
justices gave advisory opinions, which "place[ed] the court in a difficult position."' 5 ' The Massachusetts Constitutional Conventions
of 1820 and 1853 both passed proposals to remove the clause, in
148. See supra note 92.
149. Discussions of rejecting states are in Edsall, supra note 104, at 335-36;
Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 65-75; George N. Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1959). Rejecting opinions
are: Reply of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly, 33 Conn
586 (1867) (after issuing two advisories); In re Constitutionality of House Bill No.
222, 90 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1936) (overturning a 1936 statute); McJunkins v. Stevens,

102 So. 756 (La. 1925); Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Randall, 120 A.2d 195 (Md. 1956); Connor v. Herrick, 84 N.W.2d 427 (Mich. 1957)
(later provided for by constitutional amendment in 1963); In re Opinion of the Justices, 114 So. 887 (Miss. 1928); Hester v. Miller, 83 A.2d 773 (N.J. 1951) (overturning a statute under which it previously issued an advisory opinion); Workmen's

Compensation Fund v. State Indus. Comm'n, 119 N.E. 1027 (N.Y. 1918) (after issuing advisories previously); Langer v. State, 284 N.W. 238 (N.D. 1939); In re Opin-

ion of the Judges, 105 P. 325 (Okla. 1909) (later permitted by statute, limited to
death penalty cases); Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1933); deSaussure v.
Hall, 297 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. 1956); In re Opinion of the Justices, 64 A.2d 169 (Vt.
1949); State v. Danmmann, 264 N.W. 627 (Wis. 1936).

150. The first quote is in the Report of the Judicial Selection and Discipline
Committee, Minutes, (May 21, 1986); the second quote is in the Convention Proceedings, (June 4, 1986). Neither document identifies the justices.
151. Note, supra note 99, at 50.
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part owing to such objections. 152 Another observer looked grimly
in 1918 on the tendency of most advisory justices "to discourage
the practice" if not to deal downright harshly with their respective
advisory clauses. 15 3 In 1923, a strong dissent by two justices to the
Alabama Supreme Court opinion upholding the state's advisory
opinion statute observed that "[i]t is impossible to read the opinions of the courts throughout the country without coming to the
conclusion that the attitude of the judiciary generally has been unfavorable to the practice even in those states where it is expressly
permitted by their constitutions."' 54 Another wrote in 1937 that
"in all jurisdictions, jurists faced with the perplexing task of formulating an opinion in advance of litigation have forcibly expressed
the inadequacy of their positions." 155 A justice in North Dakota, a
non-advisory state, remarked in 1939 that he could "safely say that
there is not a state in the union where the [advisory opinion] provision prevails but not only the Supreme Court but every other person who has intimate knowledge of the workings of that provision
would wish it were not there." 156 Likewise it was observed in 1959
that "one cannot read the cases set forth in the annotations to
these [advisory opinion] provisions without sensing opposition to
57
the practice." 1
The advisory justices themselves have long made clear their
views of their advisory duties. In Colorado the justices' antipathy
toward what they called early on "this doubtful and perilous experiment" in advisory opinions 158 was so strong that any practical
usefulness of that state's advisory opinion clause was called "impossible" in 1932.159 For example, in the 1880s, the Colorado jus152. As in Rhode Island in 1986, both proposals to abolish the advisory opinion
clause were defeated at the polls. Aumann, supra note 18, at 33-34; Dubuque,
supra note 96, at 391-93; Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 35-37; Note, supra note 85,

at 548-52.
153. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 256.
154. In re Opinion of the Justices in re Amendment to Section 93 of the Constitution, 96 So. 487, 497 (Ala. 1923).
155. Aumann, supra note 18, at 46.
156. Langer v. State, 284 N.W. 238, 251 (N.D. 1939).
157. Stevens, supra note 149, at 11.
158. In re House Bill No. 122, 21 P. 478, 479 (Colo. 1889).
159. William H. Robinson, Jr., Limitations upon Legislative Inquiries under
ColoradoAdvisory Opinion Clause, 4 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 237, 237 (1932). Robinson cites several advisories where the justices "frankly" express their reluctance.
See, e.g., In re House Resolution No. 10, 114 P. 293 (Colo. 1911); In re Senate Resolution No. 4, 130 P. 333 (Colo. 1913).
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tices, protesting what they called the "extensive use" of the
advisory process by requesting authorities, "emphasized their pro160
test by refusing to answer the particular question proposed."
The Missouri justices were so hostile to their advisory duties that
they appear to be the first to refuse outright to give advice, despite
the mandatory language of the state's advisory opinion clause.' 6 '
Their opposition contributed to the omission of the advisory opinion clause from Missouri's 1875 Constitution. 16 2 After Missouri's
clause was omitted, the justices of the Colorado Supreme Court
16 3
commented approvingly that Missouri "profited" by experience.
In Massachusetts and Maine, "the justices have always given these
required opinions with more or less reluctance, and sometimes
with expressions of reluctance and even with protests."6' North
Carolina's Chief Justice described the members of his court as
"most reluctant to issue" advisory opinions, 165 and in 1985, the
North Carolina justices declared that advisories are not authorized
by the state constitution, apparently ending a practice of two
66
centuries.1
B. Restrictions
Before 1935, the Rhode Island justices answered just about
any question propounded to them.' 67 An 1881 advisory opinion,
for example, concerned an existing statute prohibiting licenses for
selling liquor "within four hundred feet of any public school." The
160. Note, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 228 (1889).
161. Opinion of the Justices, 37 Mo. 135 (1865). The 1865 Missouri Constitution provided that the supreme court justices "shall give their opinion... when
required by" the governor or either house. Mo. Const of 1865, art. VI, § 11.
162. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 46.
163. In re House Bill No. 122, 21 P. 478, 479 (Colo. 1889); see also In re Construction of Constitution, 54 N.W. 650 (S.D. 1893).
164. Emery, supra note 32, at 5.
165. Calogero, supra note 21, at 345 n.74; see also Bledsoe, supra note 43, at
1862.
166. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 892 (N.C. 1985). North Carolina
has issued advisories by custom, with neither constitutional nor statutory authority. On the 1985 decision, see Bledsoe, supra note 43, at 1884.
167. Between 1842, when the advisory opinion clause first went into effect, and
1935, the justices appear to have set forth a restriction only once. In 1893, they
declined to answer a question because an answer would have amounted to a criticism of already passed legislation. In re Legislative Adjournment, 27 A. 324 (RI.
1893). The restriction is applied unevenly thereafter. See In re Ten-Hour Law for
Street Ry. Corp., 54 A- 602 (R.I. 1902).
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Governor asked the justices if this meant the entire space within a
400 foot radius, or just 400 feet measured along a street or highway, and if it meant the school building or the whole school lot.
The entire space and the whole school lot, answered the justices in
an opinion two sentences long. 16 8 Beginning in 1935, however, the
justices imposed a policy setting limits on their obligation to render
advice. The justices, in effect, declared that the mandatory language of the advisory opinion clause is mandatory only when the
questions propounded conform to whatever restrictions the justices
choose to impose from time to time. The justices began developing
a set of restrictions sharply limiting the kinds of questions they
will answer. They typically imposed a new restriction in the same
opinion where they declined to give advice based on the new restriction.' 6 9 In a striking reversal of their virtually unlimited acceptance of requests for advice, the justices now declare that the
constitution and laws of the state contain ample provisions by
which the constitutionality and validity of laws may be tested "by
the court in a proper litigated case, and [that they] are loathe to
advance merely advisory opinions of the justices."170
Rhode Island was the last state whose top court placed restrictions on issuing advisory opinions. The first was Missouri, whose
justices began imposing restrictions in 1865, soon after the state's
1865 constitution established an advisory process. 17 1 They were
followed in 1877 by Massachusetts and in 1889 by Colorado. The
Colorado justices, like those of Missouri, set restrictions soon after
they were authorized to issue advisories, not surprising in view of
their open opposition to advisory duties. 1 72 Massachusetts, in con-

168.
169.

Opinion of the Judges, 13 MI. 736, 737 (1881).
See, e.g., To Certain Members of the Senate in the General Assembly, 191

A. 518 (LI. 1937) (refusing to render advice because the Senate adjourned sine die
before the justices had time to consider the question). Elsewhere this was similar.
For example, in the first opinion where the Massachusetts justices reject a request
for advice, the justices announce for the first time that they will not render advice

if the question may also arise in a litigated case and if the matter at issue cannot
be affected by legislative or executive action. They then refuse to advise on these
grounds. Opinion of the Judges, 122 Mass. 600 (1877).
170. 191 A. at 520. On the distinction between opinions of the court and opinions of the justices, see infra pp. 247-48.
171. Opinion of the Judges, 37 Mo. 135 (1865).
172. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 18, 21 P. 471 (Colo. 1889).
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trast, set restrictions after issuing unrestricted advisories for 96
years. 17 3 The other advisory states gradually followed.
In the advisory states where the justices are obliged to give
advice, 174 do the justices have authority to set restrictions and to
refuse to render advice at their pleasure? As the practice of refusing began to spread after 1877,175 so did debate on that question,
some arguing that this authority is reserved to the requesting au176
Typithority and leaves nothing to the discretion of the justices.
cal was Hugo A. Dubuque, who in 1890 took strong exception to
justices increasingly taking it upon themselves to set restrictions
on requests for advice. 177 Dubuque faulted the Massachusetts justices' first refusal on three grounds: their reasoning, their inconsistency (suddenly refusing after invariably replying for nearly a
century even when they questioned the correctness of the request),
and especially their usurping the authority of the political
branches, which are "nearer to the people" and so "presumed to
know and understand the wants of the people better than the judiciary." 178 Albert Ellingwood, writing three decades later, called refusing advisories "unhistorical and irrational," 179 and around the
same time, former Maine Chief Justice Emery said the Maine justices were incorrect in beginning to refuse advisories in 1891, since
only the requesting authority could decide what is or is not an appropriate question.' s0
By the time Ellingwood and Emery wrote, however, the practice of restricting advisory opinions was firmly established, and, by
the late 1930s, all advisory justices had developed restrictions
without challenge by the coordinate branches. Unlike Rhode Island, a majority of advisory states have constitutional or statutory
clauses limiting advisory opinions to "important questions of law"
173. 122 Mass. 600.
174. All except Alabama, Michigan and North Carolina. See app. at 254-56.

175. See, e.g., Opinion of the Judges, 58 N.H. 623 (1879) (after 95 years without
refusal); In re Opinion of the Judges, 23 Fla. 297 (1887) (after 20 years).
176. See, e.g., Dubuque, supra note 96, at 363-86; Ellingwood, supra note 18, at
161, 167; Emery, Advisory Opinion of the Justices-No. II, 11 Me. L. Rev. 1, 16
(1917); Hoffman, supranote 33, at 149-50; Note, The Validity of the Restrictionson
the Modern Advisory Opinion, 29 Me. L. Rev. 305, 313 (1978).
177. Dubuque, supra note 96, at 394-98.
178. Id. at 383-86.
179. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 176.
180.

Emery, supra note 176, at 16.
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and "solemn occasions,"'18 and there the justices have tended to
use these phrases as umbrellas under which they have placed a
wide variety of restrictions. The Maine justices, for example, ban
questions affecting private interests and questions that are not on
a subject of a general public nature, ruling neither is a solemn
18 2
occasion.
Rhode Island's advisory clause, however, is distinct in its
breadth, requiring advisories on "any question of law." This, together with the clause's mandatory language, may help explain
why the Rhode Island justices were late in developing restrictions.'8 3 Nonetheless, Rhode Island is now broadly similar to the
other advisory states in its justices' routine exercise of authority
over whether or not a question propounded comes under the advisory provisions.
The Rhode Island justices accomplished this by taking it upon
themselves to develop an interpretation of the advisory opinion
clause that permits them to refuse to render advice. Their authority to refuse is grounded in their view that "this peculiar obligation" to render advisory opinions is provided by a constitutional
clause that is obviously repugnant to the principle of separation of
powers.' 8 4 Such a clause could not have been included in the constitution without reason or purpose.'8 5 The clause was included,
the justices say, "in order to enable the executive and legislative
departments to more effectively discharge particular duties that
are textually committed to them by the Constitution." 18 6 From
this the justices infer an assistance rationale for determining when
they may properly render advice: the effective performance of constitutional obligations by the legislative and executive branches
"requires from time to time assistance from the judges of this court
upon questions of law, assistance which the framers of the consti181. Alabama, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire
and South Dakota. See app. at 254-56.
182. In re Opinion of the Justices, 191 A. 485 (Me. 1936); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 128 A. 691 (Me. 1925).
183. See Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 172-73. Writing in 1918, Ellingwood
observed that the Rhode Island justices 'have never given any indication of a disposition to withhold advice" except regarding pending litigation, which he attrib-

utes to the broad language of the advisory clause "which leaves very little
opportunity for a difference of opinion as between questioners and questioned." Id.
184. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (IRI. 1963).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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tution contemplated as being best provided through the device of
the advisory opinion." 187 This assistance, however, is not provided
for "every doubt and difficulty that might present itself." s88 While
the justices have a duty to render advice in response to proper requests, it is no less their duty, "in view of the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government," to
abstain from doing so in any case which does not "fall reasonably
within the constitutional clause relating thereto." 18 9 Hence, the
requirement of the advisory opinion clause that advice be given
upon any question of law "was intended to be exclusory in effect," 190 excluding advice that does not assist the legislature and
executive in the discharge of specific constitutional duties.
Under this broad rationale, the justices maintain a group of
restrictions on rendering advisory opinions generally similar to
those in other advisory states. The restrictions make both practical and judicial sense. They provide a screening mechanism to prevent the justices becoming overburdened by the sheer number of
requests for advice. More importantly, the restrictions place controls on a process that, first, lies outside many of the judicial limits
that have always characterized the judicial branch, and, second, is
provided by an unusually broad constitutional clause. 19 1 A brief
description of the major restrictions follows.
1. The questions propounded should not be on issues involved
in pending litigation. The Rhode Island justices will refuse to answer questions on issues that are "directly or indirectly involved"
in pending litigation. 19 2 The restriction is one of the oldest that
advisory justices have applied. 193 It addresses the due process
187. Id. The justices adhere to this "assistance" rationale for advisory opinions,
avoiding the pragmatic value rationale discussed above.
188. To Certain Members of the Senate in the General Assembly, 191 A. 518,
519 (R.I. 1937).
189. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (LI. 1963).
190. Id.
191. Of some concern here is that the justices feel free to create restrictions at
will, and set them aside at will. See infra Part IIC.
192. See, e.g., Opinion to the House of Representatives (Resolution H-1225),
149 A.2d 343, 344 (LI. 1959); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 433 A.2d
944 (R.I. 1981); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 492 A.2d 134 (R.I. 1985).
193. It was partly grounds for the Massachusetts justices' first refusal to give
advice in 1877, discussed above. Other advisory opinions imposing the restriction
early on include, Opinion of the Judges, in re Appropriationsby GeneralAssembly,

22 P. 464 (Colo. 1889). In Britain, Lord Coke as Chief Justice complained of the
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questions raised by the advisory opinion process. The Rhode Island justices point out that:
grave difficulties could follow if we were to give a purely advisory opinion upon the proposed question, only to be confronted later with the necessity of deciding the same question
after a hearing, upon review or otherwise, in the litigated
case. In such event, the defendant conceivably might have
some ground to complain that his legal and constitutional
rights had been unnecessarily prejudiced by our having
reached a considered opinion, even though only advisory,
upon a material question of law which we knew to have been
involved in his conviction, without yet having afforded him a
19 4
full hearing.
Since litigation usually involves private interests, this restriction includes within it two others that some other advisory states
put forth somewhat more distinctly and perhaps more strongly.
One is the ban on questions that affect private rights, 9 5 and the
other is a parallel ban on questions that are not upon matters or
subjects of a general public nature.' 9 6
2. The question should seek advice that relates directly to the
requesting authority's duties presently awaitingperformance; and
the action of the requesting authority must depend on the advice.
The Rhode Island justices have been emphatic in requiring a direct
connection between the question propounded and the pending constitutional duties of the requesting authority. The chief executive
must have a present constitutional duty awaiting performance for
which the advice is needed; the legislature must have concerns
about the constitutionality of pending legislation.' 9 7 Requesting
frequency of advisory requests from James I on matters pending before the courts.
Note, supra note 172, at 308, 320.
194. 149 A.2d at 346.
195. See, eg., Opinion of the Justices, 66 A.2d 76 (N.H. 1949); Opinion of the
Judges, 140 N.W.2d 74 (S.D. 1966).
196. The justices in Alabama, Colorado and Maine have explicitly prohibited
advisory opinions not on matters or subjects of a general public nature. In re Opinion of the Justices, 436 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 1983); In re Advisory Opinion, 21 P. 478
(Colo. 1888); 128 A. 691 (Me. 1925).
197. See In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding House Bill 83-H-5640,
472 A.2d 301, 302 (R.I. 1984); In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d
1316 (R.I. 1986). On the requirement that the question relate to the duties of the
requesting authority, see Opinion of the Justices, 238 So. 2d 326 (Ala. 1970); Opinion of the Justices, 305 A.2d 608 (Del. 1973); In re Executive Communication Concerning Powers of Legislature, 6 So. 925 (Fla. 1887); Opinion of the Justices, 105
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authorities may not seek advice on behalf of an unauthorized
party. The justices, for example, rejected an advisory request in
which the Governor "improperly" sought advice on behalf of city
council members, in which instance "the giving of opinions would
be grossly gratuitous and an inexcusable participation by the
judges in the affairs of a municipality."' 9
3. Requests from the legislature for advice regardinglegislation should be on pending legislation only. The Rhode Island justices, like most advisory judges, will not issue advice on legislation
already enacted because passed legislation is presumed to be constitutional. 19 9 Here they rely on "the universally accepted rule
that when a legislature, acting in the exercise of the legislative
power, enacts a statute, it will be presumed to have acted within
20 0
the constitutional limitations until the contrary is shown."
Hence, "consistency with the constitution is not a proper matter for
inquiry" regarding passed legislation. 20 1 The executive, however,
may seek advice on passed legislation if the advice is needed in
20 2
order to complete a constitutional duty.
4. The justices will not render advice if the legislaturehas adjourned sine die The justices will refuse to give advice when the
legislature has adjourned before it could receive the advice and
A.2d 454 (Me. 1952); Opinion of the Justices, 66 A.2d 76 (N.H. 1949). On the "live
gravity" standard (that the advice must relate to a present duty awaiting
peformance), see Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court in Response to
Questions Propounded by the Governor, 200 A.2d 570 (Del. 1964); Opinion of the
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court given under the provisions of Section 3 of
Article VI of the Constitution, 355 A-2d 341 (Me. 1976); Opinion of the Justices,
340 A.2d 112 (N.H. 1975).
198. In re Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295 (LI. 1971).
199. See, e.g., Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126 (R.I.
1965); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 216 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1966); In re
Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 264 A.2d 920 (PRI. 1970). Michigan is an exception in that it permits advice only after enactment of legislation,
but "before its effective date." Mich. Const. art. I, § 8.
200. In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 129 (R.I.
1965).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 264 A.2d 920
(R.I. 1970) (ruling that "questions concerning the validity of previously enacted
legislation are the exclusive prerogative of the executive); see also In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 483 A.2d 1078, 1079 (R.I. 1984); Opinion of the Justices,
384 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 396 A.2d 219 (Me. 1979);
Opinion of the Justices, 463 A.2d 891 (N.H. 1983).
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without setting a day on which to assemble again.2 0 3 "In such circumstances these questions thereupon become moot" and no longer
require the consideration of the justices. 204 Advice is then presumably useless since the wisdom of the advisory opinion clause, the
justices have said, is to guide the coordinate departments "on a
question pending and awaiting action in the body which seeks our
assistance."20 5 The adjournment must be sine die; the justices will
issue advice when each house has adjourned subject to recall. 20 6
They have also ruled that they are not obliged to give advice to a
succeeding legislative body in reply to a request propounded by a
preceding legislative body.207
5. Questions should not be hypothetical, unclear or unduly
broad, and they should refer directly to pertinent constitutional
clauses. The Rhode Island justices practice a judicial economy, declining to render advice when the "burden on the justices would be
greater than the benefit conferred on the requesting authority."2 0 8
Accordingly, the justices will not respond to questions that are abstract or hypothetical, or otherwise insufficiently specific or clear
as to the thrust of the inquiry.20 9 They will respond only to questions which are clear enough to avoid the possibilty of creating confusion in the minds of the requesting authority or of the general
public.2 10 The justices will not respond to questions that have "too
broad a sweep to fall within the purview of our constitutional obligation to render advisory opinions," particularly if the requesting
203. See In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 272 A.2d 925
(RI. 1971); see also, e.g., In re Senate Bill No. 416, 101 P. 410 (Colo. 1909). New
Hampshire is an exception in that its justices will render advice for use at a possible future special session or the next regular one if the advice is so requested, or
might be of benefit. Opinion of the Justices, 37 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1944).
204. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 206 A.2d 221, 222 (RI. 1965).
205. 272 A.2d at 927.
206. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d 550 (RI.

1984).
207. 272 A.2d at 926.
208. Carberry, supra note 82, at 100.
209. See Advisory Opinion to His Excellency, Frank Licht, Governor of the

State of Rhode Island, 289 A.2d 430 (ILI. 1972); see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices,
100 So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1958); In re Opinions of the Justices, 88 A.2d 128 (Del. 1952);
Opinion of the Justices, 355 A.2d 341 (Me. 1976); Answer of the Justices to the
House of Representatives, 377 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1978).
210. See Opinion to the Senate, 137 A.2d 527 (RI. 1958); see also Opinion of the

Justices, 216 A.2d 656 (Me. 1966).
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authority fails to indicate the specific provision of the constitution
21 1
which might be violated.
6. The justices will not exercise fact finding power when rendering advisory opinions. The justices will issue advice only on
questions of law, never on questions of fact. 212 One observer attributed this restriction to the justices' lack of resources permitting
examinations of facts, 213 but more important is the care advisory

justices take to approach advisory power as extra-judicial--distinct from characteristically judicial activity such as fact finding.
In denying advice to the Governor, for example, the Rhode Island
justices ruled that their constitutional obligation to advise:
does not apply to inquiries that can be answered only through
an exercise of the factfinding power, inasmuch as the justices
of this court, in so doing, are acting as individuals and not
exercising the judicial power of the state.... [T]he factfinding
power inheres in the court as the judicial branch of state govermient and... may not be exercised by justices when acting
as individuals pursuant to the provisions of amendment xii,
section 2 [the advisory clause]. 21 4
C.

Waiving the Restrictions

The justices regularly set forth their restrictions, sometimes
quite fully 21 5 and nearly always categorically. Only occasionally
211. Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 277 A,2d 750, 752 (RlI. 1970); see also
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 437 A.2d 542, 543 (LI. 1981) (ruling that "the
body seeking our advice should specify the particular provisions of the Federal and
State Constitutions which might be violated by the legislation under review"). According to Carberry, Rhode Island is relatively strict in this requirement,
Carberry, supra note 82, at 102. But see Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 278 A2d
852 (R.I. 1971) (giving advice when the constitutional clause implicated is not specified but merely implied); see also In re House Bill No. 107, 39 P. 431 (Colo. 1895);
In re Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1979 PA 57, 281 N.W.2d
322 (Mich. 1979). The Delaware and New Hampshire justices are less restrictive,
both permitting questions regarding an entire statute for general testing by the
justices against all possible constitutional limitations. See, eg., Opinion of the Justices, 330 A.2d 769 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 254 A-2d 273 (N.H. 1969).
212. See, eg., In re Opinion to the Governor, 91 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963); In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 324 A.2d 641 (RlI. 1974); see also, e.g., Opinion
of the Justices, 382 A-2d 1364 (Del. 1978); Opinion of the Justices, 463 A.2d 891
(N.H. 1983); In re Construction of Constitution, 54 N.W. 650 (S.D. 1893).
213. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 218.
214. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 324 A-2d 641, 647 (RI. 1974).
215. See, e.g., In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126 (R.I.
1965); In re Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295 (IRI. 1971).
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do they suggest that they engage in the practice of waiving restrictions at will. 2 1 6 Former Rhode Island Chief Justice Fay, in a letter
to Louisiana's Chief Justice, wrote that the Rhode Island justices
"only answer [requests for advice] if they meet the criteria set forth
in our cases." 2 17 In truth, the justices waive their criteria whenever they think it warranted. Primarily, the justices will waive
their restrictions if they believe advice "appears of pressing, practical necessity," 2 18 and they will waive their restrictions if they be2 19
lieve an important constitutional or public issue is involved.
Waivers are usually explained in very broad terms if at all.
For instance, in their advisory opinion on the Governor withholding funds to cities and towns,2 2 0 the justices said they would "overlook the procedural deficiencies" in the request for an opinion
"because of the constitutional and public importance of the question propounded to the court."2 2 1 In support they merely pointed
to the fact that some or all of the towns and cities rely on the funds
in question. 2 2 2 The justices generally do not offer standards by
which they decide what questions are important. Indeed, thenJustice Weisburger. objected to his colleagues giving advice under
these circumstances.22 A 1986 advisory opinion2 was issued despite pending litigation before the Rhode Island Ethics Commis216. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 272 A.2d
925,927 (R.I. 1971) (denying advice in part because the question from the House of
Representatives involved pending legislation and because advice will not be rendered to a succeeding legislative body on a question propounded by a preceding
body, but noting that "there may arise some grave governmental emergency justifying an exception to this principle").
217. Letter from Rhode Island Chief Justice Thomas Fay to Louisiana Chief
Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. (May 29, 1991) (copy on file with author).
218. See, e.g., In re Opinion to the Governor, 153 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 1959) (rendering advice on passed legislation); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Conflict of Interest Coimm'n), 504 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1986) (rendering advice despite
pending litigation, since the Governor's ability to persuade qualified persons to
accept positions of public trust would otherwise be jeopardized).
219. See, e.g., In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664 (RI. 1993) (rendering advice despite absence of present constitutional duty awaiting performance
by the Governor, owing to "public and constitutional importance").
220. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d 1371,
1372 (ILI. 1990).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1375-76 (Weisburger, J., dissenting). On the question of whether
advisory opinions can have dissents, see infra p. 248. In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor (Appointed Counsel), 666 A.2d 813, 818 (ILI. 1996) (Murray, J.,
dissenting).
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sion, notwithstanding a ruling just eight months earlier that the
restriction against advice involving pending litigation applied to
2
administrative proceedings as well as to judicial proceedings. 2
Here the justices simply cited without explanation the "public in2 26
terest" in the question involved.

The justices appear to be increasingly free in waiving their
own judicially crafted restrictions. In 1986, they rendered advice
responding to a question jointly propounded by the Governor and
the General Assembly concerning the removal of a supreme court
justice. The request for advice violated the justices' restrictions on
joint requests, on requests where the Governor lacks any present
constitutional duty awaiting performance, and on requests that
lack a formal resolution in either house petitioning the court for
advice. The justices issued the advice anyway, waiving the procedural defects owing to "the profoundly important substantive issues" involved. The justices, however, stressed that "we shall not
consider this action as a precedent indicating that in the future we
shall render an advisory opinion when the requesting petition is
improperly before this court."2 2 7 Seven years later they issued ad-

vice to the Governor on revolving door legislation despite finding
the request defective because the Governor had no present constitutional duty awaiting performance for which the advice was necessary. The justices waived the defect using language identical to
the 1986 opinion 2 28 owing to the "public importance and constitutional importance" of the question. This time, however, they were
2 29
silent altogether about not establishing a precedent.
The justices' broad discretion to issue advisory opinions even
on questions not conforming to their own, equally discretionary,
restrictions raises several problems. Perhaps most important,
freely waiving their restrictions neutralizes the benefit of the restrictions in shoring up the legitimacy of an advisory process troubled by the extent to which it lies outside the limits of the judicial
224. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Conflict of Interest Commission),
504 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1986).
225. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 492 A.2d 134, 134 (1RI. 1985).
226. 504 A.2d at 459. The public interest cited was the Governor's ability to
bring qualified people to positions of public trust. Id.
227. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1318-19 (RLI. 1986).
228. 'We shall exercise our discretion and waive the defect." In re Advisory
from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 667 (R.I. 1993).
229, Id.
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and political doctrines discussed earlier. In this respect, the waivers weaken the justices' policy of strict interpretation of the advisory opinion clause, which after all is their purported justification
for their restrictions in the first place. Further, the justices' main
criteria for waiving restrictions are so broad they could conceivably
apply to nearly all of the questions propounded.
The public or constitutional importance standard seems espedally overbroad since, for one thing, advisory opinions avoid questions involving private interests and are by their nature on
matters and issues of a general public nature, and, for another, the
questions generally relate to constitutional duties. Consequently,
any question propounded may plausibly be said to have some public or constitutional importance. Similarly, the pressing, practical
necessity standard could apply to virtually any question propounded. The governor and legislature are not likely to send the
justices questions that they do not feel need to be answered. The
governor and legislature do after all live in a political world characterized by pressing and practical necessity. In addition, since
the justices have not made clear what standards they apply to decide what is important or pressing, it is less likely that anyone can
reasonably predict what a proper request for advice is, or determine why some questions failing to meet the justices' restrictions
are rejected for that reason, and why some are not. In short, it has
become increasingly difficult to determine the scope of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's advisory jurisdiction.
D.

The Question of Precedent:Advisory Opinions as Purportedly
Non-Judicialand Therefore Non-Binding

In addition to restrictions on requests for advice, the judicial
difficulties of the advisory process are purportedly mitigated in another way. The Rhode Island justices put forth advisory opinions
as products of non-judicial action by judges sitting in a non-judicial
capacity, and as such, their advice is purportedly non-binding,
without force or effect of precedent. They do not constitute a decision of the court.2 30 Hence, presumably, since advisory opinions
230. Opinion to the Governor, 149 A.2d 341,342 (RI. 1959); see also Opinion to
the Governor, 153 A.2d 168, 170 (R.I. 1959) (ruling that the duty of issuing advice
is a "duty on the judges,' not on the supreme court "as a judicial department of the
state government"). The Rhode Island justices have this in common with most
advisory justices.
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are not binding, they cannot violate separation of powers 2 3 ' or due
process. 23 2 This non-adjudicative status ostensibly frees the justices from judicial restraints; as advisors they are not a court, not
even judicial officers, but are simply giving advice in their off
hours, as it were, when they are free to "go fishing, play golf, or
advise the governor and legislature on matters of constitutional
law." 2 3 3

The Rhode Island justices' earliest general statement about
advisories was that they were "not a decision of this court" and
"can have no weight as a precedent."2 34 This statement was in an
adjudicated opinion, Taylor v. Place,23 5 in which the justices noted
that both the plaintiff and the defendant referred them to an advisory opinion. The justices replied that the question at hand was
2 36 and hence,
being brought to them for the first time "judicially,"
their earlier advice could not be binding. This scenario was repeated over a century later when, again in an adjudicated case,
plaintiffs counsel cited what the justices called "generous portions
of an advisory opinion given by the justices." The justices again
asserted the opinion was only advisory and without precedential
weight. 23 7 In a response to a question from the Governor, a 1959
advisory opinion began with the following observation:
It may be helpful to point out that the constitution by its express language imposes a mandatory duty on the judges of
the supreme court to answer such questions. Section 2 [the
231. See, e.g., Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 168-69.
232. See, e.g., Calogero, supra note 21, at 366.
233. Sands, supra note 111, at 4.
234. Taylor v. Place, 4 LI. 324, 362 (1856). For nearly a century-from the
creation of the advisory opinion clause in 1842 until 1935--this was the only such
general observation on advisories by Rhode Island justices. See also In re Opinion
of the Governor, 103 A. 513 (R-I. 1918).
235. 4 RI. 324.
236. Id. at 362.
237. Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 250 A.2d 426 (R.I. 1968). The
advisory opinion cited by the plaintiff is In re Opinion to the Governor,69 A.2d 531
(R.I. 1949). Most other advisory justices are equally emphatic about advisory opinions' lack of precedential weight. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 198 So. 2d 269
(Ala. 1967); In re Opinion of the Justices, 88 A.2d 128, 139 (Del. 1952) (upholding
the constitutionality of the state's advisory statute); Opinion of the Justices, 170
A.2d 652 (Me. 1961); Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 249 N.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1969). In Colorado and South Dakota, where
the advisory clauses specify the "supreme court" and not the "justices," advisories
have been ruled binding. In re House Bill No. 122, 21 P. 478 (Colo. 1889); In re
House Resolution 30, 72 N.W. 892 (S.D. 1897).
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advisory opinion clause] does not impose that duty on the
supreme court as a judicial department of the state government.... Opinions of the justices given under sec. 2 of art.
XII of amendments to the state constitution are merely
238
advisory.
This means, as the justices state elsewhere, that an advisory
opinion:
is in no sense a decision of the supreme court.... [Tihe judges
do not speak ex cathedra, from the chair of judgment, but
only as consultors somewhat like the jurisconsults under the
Roman law. However sound the opinion may be, it carries no
mandate. For this reason it is not an exercise of our judicial
power.

2 39

That advisory opinions are non-binding is plausible in theory
and consistently and frequently asserted by the Rhode Island justices.2 4 0 But common sense, practice and virtually all observers of
the advisory process say otherwise. Common sense dictates that
when the state's highest judges give advice, it is an offer that cannot be refused. In fact, requesting authorities rarely if ever take
action contradicting the advice of the justices, 4 1 and the advice
has always been treated, and spoken of, as precedential. Maine's
Chief Justice Emery noted in 1908 that advisory opinions are
"often cited as judicial authority and the people are prone to regard
them as adjudications to be adhered to despite all argument to the
contrary. The practical result is that the opinion becomes, in the

238. Opinion to the Governor, 153 A.2d 168, 170 (R.I. 1959).
239.

Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553, 555 (RlI. 1961).

240. The justices comment in one advisory opinion that they are "reiterating
what has so often been stated in the past." 174 A.2d at 555; see also Opinion to the
Governor, 149 A.2d 341, 343 (LI. 1959); Opinion to the House of Representatives
(Resolution H-1225), 149 A.2d 343, 345 (R.I. 1959); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126, 129 (LI. 1965); Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295,
296 (ILI. 1971).
241. See, e.g, Note, supra note 128, at 1304; Bledsoe, supra note 43, at 1888,
1896; Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 154. Sands comments that it would be "absurdly naive" to think that the advice should be taken as anything but a reliable
prediction of how the court will hold if the same question came before it later in
litigation. Sands, supra note 111, at 25. The Delaware justices are explicit; while
their advisory opinions are "binding on no one," they are still "what one would
expect the justices to say if the issue had been presented to them in litigation."
Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Del. 1980).
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minds of the people, a rule of law established without argument or
hearing."2 4 2 In 1949, Oliver P. Field wrote:
advisory opinions are used as precedent by the bar, by the
courts, and by the public. They are cited in briefs, in opinions
by the courts, and despite the fact that they are sometimes
carefully distinguished from judicial decisions, they are relied
on as fully as decisions, as far as precedent is concerned.2 4 3
And in 1989, Robert H. Kennedy remarked on the "plain evidence
that advisory opinions become binding abstractions, the effect of
which can neither be predicted nor controlled."2 44
The Rhode Island justices themselves treat advisory opinions
as precedents in fact, if not within their stated theory. The court's
adjudicated opinions freely rely on advisory opinions, citing them
without distinction from adjudicated opinions, and never in this
context noting the non-binding nature of the advisories. A 1992
opinion advised the Governor on the legislative powers of the
Rhode Island Ethics Commission. 245 The opinion cited advisory
opinions, including two from other states, and relied on them, often
extensively, in a manner indistinguishable from their citations of
and reliance on judicial opinions. For example, on the justices'
point that constitutional conventions are products of the formally
expressed will of the people, they cited only two advisory opinions.2 4 6 On constructing constitutional amendments, the justices

cited two advisory opinions, each one grouped without distinction
with two adjudicated opinions.2 4 7 To support the point that it is
proper for them to consult extrinsic sources when construing constitutional provisions, the justices cited three advisories mingled
248
with citations from litigated cases.
242. Emery, supra note 32, at 2.
243. Field, supra note 84, at 216.
244. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 198.
245. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d 1 (R.I.
1992).
246. 612 A.2d at 7 (citing Opinion to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d
116 (R I. 1965); In re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A. 433, 452 (R.I. 1935)).
247. Id. (citing In re Opinion of the Justices, 120 A. 868 (LI. 1923); Opinion to
the House of Representatives, 6 A.2d 627 (R.I. 1953)).
248. Id. at 7-8; In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316 (R.I.
1986); see also Opinion of the Justices, 133 A.2d 790 (N.H. 1957); Opinion to the
Governor, 185 A.2d 111 (MI. 1962) (citing In re Interrogatories Propounded by the
Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1975)).
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The justices cite advisory opinions in litigated cases just as
freely. In a litigated case concerning dual office holding, the court's
interpretation of article IX, section 6 of the state constitution relied
solely on one advisory opinion.2 49 In another litigated case, the
court, putting forth a rule of statutory construction, similarly relied only on one advisory opinion. 25 0 In another, the justices assert
that "[i]t has unquestionably been the established law" that the
legislature cannot exercise judicial power, citing without distinction both an early advisory opinion and a litigated case. 2 5 '
It makes no more practical or judicial sense to claim that
judges, not the court, issue advice than it does to claim that the
advice is not binding. The Rhode Island justices attribute the purportedly non-binding character of an advisory opinion to their status as "individual judges" who are not performing a judicial
function. 25 2 This is crucial to the effective immunity of the advisory process from the judicial safeguards discussed above. Some
argue that separation of powers, for example, "is not affected in the
slightest by the advisory opinion:" advisories are not a judicial
function, so "it is difficult to see how they can interfere with the
exercise of judicial power."2 5 3 For advisory purposes, the Rhode
Island justices are transformed from a court handing down decisions to legal advisors "acting in their individual capacities"2 4 to
offer non-adjudicative expressions of personal points of view. 2 55 As
with the non-binding effect of advisories, the distinction between
justices giving advice and a supreme court handing down decisions
249. The advisory opinion is In re Opinion of the Justices, 116 A.2d 474 (LI.
1955), cited in Davis v. Hawksley, 379 A.2d 922, 924 (RI. 1977).
250. The advisory opinion is Opinion to the Governor, 80 A.2d 165 (R.I. 1951),
cited in Surber v. Pearce, 195 A.2d 541, 543 (LI. 1963).

251. State v. Garnetto, 63 A.2d 777 (LI. 1949) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 3
RI. 299 (1853); Taylor v. Place, 4 LI. 324 (1856)); see also Calogero, supra note 21,
at 366; Carberry, supra note 82, at 83; Smiljanich, supra note 43, at 332 (studying
all Florida advisory opinions to 1971 and finding that a majority were cited in later
cases as authority). On the tendency ofjudges and litigants to view advisory opinions as binding, see also Edsall, supra note 104, at 330-32; Ellingwood, supra note
18, at 311; McKeever & Perry, supra note 17, at 791.
252. See, e.g., Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (LI. 1971).
253. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 168-69.
254. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 615 (LI. 1963).
255. Other advisory states stress the same point. E.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 96 So. 487 (Ala. 1923); In re Opinion of the Justices, 320 A.2d 735 (Del. 1974);
Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615 (Fla. 1922); In re Opinion of the Justices, 69 A. 627 (Me.
1908); Standiford v. Kloman, 83 A. 311 (N.H. 1912).
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understandably tends to be lost. The distinction is, after all, a formality only, necessary to save the appearance of advisory opinions
as non-judicial. There is nothing implausible about two Alabama
Supreme Court justices calling the distinction "illusory" and
"unsubstantial."2 56
The Rhode Island justices have usually, but not always, held
to the distinction. They have occasionally referred to the "court" or
the "supreme court" giving advice, 257 and sometimes the opinions
of justices in the minority are called dissents. Since advisory justices act in their individual capacities, express only personal points
of view and do not sit as a court, there is no opinion from which to
dissent. 2 58 A minority opinion is simply one whose advice differs
from the advice of a majority of the justices. The Rhode Island justices nevertheless will from time to time speak of "dissent" in this
context, as in a minority advisory opinion from one justice which is
headed "Murray, Justice, dissenting," and begins "I respectfully
dissent."2 59 Other justices appear to be aware of the problem with
the word: for example, Justice Rogers, who gave what he called a
"separate opinion" disagreeing with the advisory opinion of the
other justices. 260 "Dissent" in a judicial context denotes opposition
to a majority opinion that is binding and "official." As such, the
term indicates an act and a relationship that do not properly exist
in an advisory context.
It is, however, hardly remarkable that an advisory justice
would speak of dissenting. Advice differing from that of a majority
superficially resembles a dissent in an adjudicated case, and it is
256.

96 So. at 499 (Sayre & Miller, JJ., dissenting to the majority ruling that

the Alabama advisory opinion statute is constitutional).
257.

See, e.g., In re Opinion of Justices, 97 A. 21 (R.I. 1916); In re Opinion of the

Justices, 120 A. 868 (ILI. 1923); In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d
1316 (R.I. 1986).
258. See Field, supra note 82, at 215-16; Ellingwood, supranote 18, at 150-52.
259. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Appointed Counsel) 666 A.2d 813,
818 (R.I. 1995) (Murray, J., dissenting); see In re Ten Hour Street Law for Street
Railway Corp., 54 A. 602, 607 (R.I. 1902) (Blodgett, J., dissenting); In re Advisory
Opinion to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d 1371, 1375 (LI. 1990) (Weisburger, J., dissenting).
260. In re Opinion of the Justices, 36 A. 716, 717 (R.I. 1897). In the recent
advisory opinion on filling a vacancy in the office of Lieutenant Governor, a headnote refers to Justice Lederberg's "td]issenting [olpinion," and this opinion is captioned "Lederberg, Justice, dissenting." The opinion text itself, however, begins "I
respectfully disagree" and nowhere refers to "dissenting." In re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor, No. 96-565-M.P. (issued January 22, 1997).
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easy for the justices to slip into language to which they are accustomed, based on the adjudicative processes to which they are accustomed. But there is more going on here than custom. What the
justices are slipping into is not only familiar language; it is also the
language of legitimacy.
E. Communicating the PurportedLegitimacy of Advisory
Opinions
The Supreme Court is limited in its interpetation of the constitution only by self-restraint responding to legal tradition
and the claims of moral duty.... The legitimacy of judicial
decrees depends ... in considerable part on public confidence

that the judges are predominantly engaged not in making
26
personal political judgments but in applying a body of law. '

In view of the questions troubling the advisory process discussed so far, it is not unexpected that the Rhode Island justices'
advisory opinions reflect some concern for the perceived legitimacy
of the advisory process. They do so in part by adopting the devices
of the adjudicative process and of adjudicated opinions. In many
ways, the advisory process, like the language of advisory opinions,
has become similar to that of adjudication. Briefs and argument
have lent "an increasingly judicial flavor to the advisory process,
further blurring the already imprecise distinction between decisions of the court and opinions of the justices."2 62 The forms of
reasoning in advisory opinions are indistinguishable from those in
adjudicated opinions. 2 63 The advisory justices tend to adopt a style
honed through two centuries of adversarial proceedings, where an
opinion is not only constructed in large part out of arguments and
briefs of petitioner and respondent, but is shaped as a series of responses to directly opposing arguments.
The 1992 advisory opinion on the Rhode Island Ethics Commission's legislative powers originated when the Commission formally ruled that the constitution's clause providing for the
Commission2 6 4 also authorizes the Commission to enact ethics
261.
262.
263.
264.

Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 362 (1987).
Carberry, supra note 82, at 105.
Sands, supra note 111, at 26.
R.I. Const art. III, § 8.
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laws independently of the legislature. 2 65 After the Commission
proceeded to create several such laws, the Governor sought an advisory opinion on whether the Commission had such legislative
powers under the constitutional provision. The justices published
an invitation for briefs and arguments, and among those responding were the Governor and House of Representatives arguing
against the Commission's interpretation, and the Attorney General and Common Cause arguing in favor of it. The briefs and arguments centered on separation of powers, the United States
Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 26 6 the original intentions of the
Constitutional Convention creating the advisory opinion clause,
and standards of constitutional interpretation. Over a third of the
twenty page advisory opinion explicitly responded to the oral and
written arguments submitted, offering no additional significant arguments to support the justices' conclusion that the commission
indeed has legislative powers to create ethics laws. 26 7 It is difficult

to distinguish this advisory from an adjudicated opinion.
Observers note the strong similarities between advisory and
adjudicated opinions, including reliance on precedent, on briefs
and argument, often by opposing counsel, and on the precise reasoning characteristic of judicial opinions. The observers attribute
such similarities to force of habit, the "judicial propensity for exactness and dependence on precedent,"2 68 and to the justices believing
the advisory process is normal judicial work.2 6 9 But the similarities indicate more than that; advisory justices adopt the devices of
the judicial process as a balance to the inescapable reality that the
advisory process lies outside judicial procedure and outside the judicial safeguards discussed earlier. This process is not made entirely "safe" by the justices' policy of strict interpretation and the
concomitant set of restrictions, or by insistence on advisory opinions as non-binding and non-judicial.
Writing advisory opinions like judicial opinions effectively borrows the legitimacy of the adjudicative process and projects it onto
265. Rhode Island Ethics Commission Resolution (August 22, 1991). The author, then a member of the commission, introduced the resolution.
266. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
267. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d 1 (R.I.
1992).
268. Ellingwood, supra note 18, at 147.
269. Field, supra note 82, at 215; see also Calogero, supra note 21, at 349;
Carberry, supra note 82, at 5.
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the advisory process. It is just because advisory opinions he
outside traditional limits of the judicial process and disturb longstanding notions of judicial legitimacy that the justices employ a
communication ethos that sustains the authority of the court when
its justices issue advisory opinions. There is nothing unusual
about this; those who are in positions of authority naturally communicate in ways that recall the grounds of their authority, and
they do so more or less depending on the perceived need to communicate their legitimacy. The adoption of the careful, limiting,
highly circumscribed manner of writing adjudicated opinions provides advisory opinions with a legitimizing rhetoric. What Justice
Frankfurter said of the United States Constitution holds true for
the states: "The Constitution's authority ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.... [Tihere is nothing judicially more unseemly nor more self-defeating than for this
Court to make in terrorempronouncements .... . 27 0 Advisory opinions are in danger of being just such pronouncements, operating
under the thin cover of claims of non-binding, non-adjudicative,
personal advice giving. The rhetoric of adjudicated opinions carried over to advisories helps the justices speak as if they were a
court acting within the bounds of the judicial system.
Adjudicated opinions, like the judicial process, are hedged all
around by limits. Hamilton argued that the power of judicial review, for example, would not be dangerous because the courts
"should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them."2 7 1 The advisory justices must communicate
that they are engaged not merely in personal or arbitrary pronouncements. In a government of constitutionally limited powers,
they must constantly show that they work to stay within those limits. That in general is the condition of legitimacy, 27 2 and on that
"the legitimacy of judicial decrees depends." 2 73
270. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
271. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Cox, supra note
261, at 69.
272. Alan Hyde, The Concept ofLegitimation in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 Wis.
L. Rev. 379, 401 (1983).
273. Cox, supra note 261, at 362; see also Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an EmpiricalAnalysis, 8 Law & Pol'y
257 (1986); Mel A. Topf, CommunicatingLegitimacy in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 12 Language & Comm. 17 (1992).
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Advisory justices, freed from the constraints of the judicial
process, reintroduce constraints and make clear they are doing so.
For example, the advisory justices' recourse to the forms and language of precedent recalls a fundamental doctrine of Anglo-American judicial reasoning, one that requires the court to limit itself to
"finding" its decision in previous cases. Hence the decision is not
presented as the personal or political opinions of judges because
the decision was always there, in past cases, beyond the wills of the
present members of the court. 27 4 Briefs and argument, for another
example, not only allow interested parties to have their say in the
advisory process (recalling to it the obvious legitimating force of
due process); they also allow the justices to write advisory opinions
integrating the often opposing arguments of the participating parties into their reasoning. The justices are here grafting on to the
advisory process not merely a customary mode of writing judicial
opinions but also a core characteristic of the Anglo-American judicial process-its adversarial nature. A court has little formal
means of discovering facts, and truth, other than through disputing parties: "Truth in the judicial process comes from the clash of
opposities, in the arena of the courtroom."2 7 5

By carrying over

such devices from the adjudicative process, the advisory justices
are informing the advisory process with the "strict rules and precedents" which the process in and of itself so clearly lacks and which
are hallmarks of limitations on judicial power. The justices are engaged in reinforcing the legitimacy of their advice.
CONCLUSION

The legitimacy of the advisory opinion process, and of the
court whose justices render advice, remains vulnerable to challenge. The justices have, with doubtful success, attempted to protect the legitimacy of the process with an "assistance" rationale for
the advisory opinion clause and concomitant restrictions on ren274.

Milsom, supra note 119, at 81.

275.

A.S. Miller & J.A Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and

the Flow of Information to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1187,
1189 (1975); see also Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, ch. 3 (5th ed. 1986);
Leonard W. Levy, The Origins of the Fifth Amendment, ch. 1 (1986). On the contrast to the continental (inquisitorial) system's omission of any indication of argument in opinions, see Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France,and
Soviet Russia, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1010, 1015 (1974); J. Gillis Wetter, The Styles of
Appellate Judicial Opinions 50-51 (1960).
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dering advice. We have seen, however, that the justices have acted
with questionable discretion in the face of a non-discretionary advisory opinion clause, and with a kind of double discretion by
which they create restrictions at will and waive them at will. The
justices offer inadequate standards by which they apply their two
chief grounds for waivers-practical necessity and public or constitutional importance. Most, if not all, advisory opinion requests arguably are necessary or important, or both. At any rate, it is just
those questions of great public importance that the justices should
generally stay away from, until the political process and public debate have had their effects and until an adjudicated case is properly before them; and it is just those questions of constitutional
importance that usually arise out of questions of fact developed in
the adversarial arena of litigation. 27 6 The justices have also held
to the doubtful assertion of the non-binding and non-judicial nature of the advisory process whose product is said to be personal
advice rendered by justices who are not a court. Over all these
attempts to shore up the troubled legitimacy of the advisory process hovers the long, emphatic history of federal rejection and the
always present challenges of the separation of powers doctrine,
due process, case or controversy requirements, absence of concrete
facts, risk of prejudiced justices, and the advisory process's chilling
effect on political activity and public debate.
At the least, the Rhode Island justices should apply their restrictions more consistently, waiving them more cautiously and by
clearer standards. In the end, however, the advisory opinion
clause should be removed from the Rhode Island Constitution and
the advisory process abolished. It is neither wise nor necessary for
Rhode Island.

276.

See Kennedy, supra note 32, at 189 n49.
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APPENDIX
ADVISORY OPINION CLAUSES
ALABAMA
The Governor, by a request in writing, or either house of the
Legislature, by a resolution of such house, may obtain a written opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Alabama
or a majority thereof on important constitutional questions.
Ala. Code § 12-2-10 (1995).
COLORADO
The supreme court shall give its opinion on important questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor,
the senate, or the house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be published in connection with the reported decision of said court.
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3.
DELAWARE
The Justices of the Supreme Court, whenever the Governor of
this State or a majority of the members elected to each House
may by resolution require it for public information, or to enable them to discharge their duties, may give them their opinions in writing touching the proper construction of any
provision in the Constitution of this State, or of the United
States, or the constitutionality of any law or legislation
passed by the General Assembly, or the constitutionality of
any proposed constitutional amendment which shall have
been first agreed to by two-thirds of all members elected to
each House.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141(a) (1996).
FLORIDA
The governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question affecting his
executive powers and duties. The justices shall, subject to
their rules of procedure, permit interested persons to be
heard on the questions presented and shall render their writ-
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ten opinion not earlier than ten days from the filing and docketing of the request, unless in their judgment the delay would
cause public injury.
Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(c).
MAINE
The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall be obliged to
give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon
solemn occasions, when required by the Governor, Senate, or
House of Representatives.
Me. Const. art. VI, § 3.
MASSACHUSETTS
Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the
council, shall have the authority to require the opinions of the
justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.
Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. 3, art. 2.
MICHIGAN
Either house of the legislature or the governor may request
the opinion of the supreme court on important questions of
law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its effective date.
Mich. Const. art. Il, § 8.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and
council shall have the authority to require the opinions of the
justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law
and upon solemn occasions.
N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 74.
OKLAHOMA
[Upon receiving notice and record of a conviction requiring
judgment of death,] [t]he Governor may thereupon require
the opinion of the Judges of the Criminal Court of Appeals, or
any of them, upon the statement so furnished.
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Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1003 (West 1986).
RHODE ISLAND
The judges of the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or by either house of the general assembly.
R.I. Const. art. X, § 3.
SOUTH DAKOTA
The Governor has authority to require opinions of the
Supreme Court upon important questions of law involved in
the exercise of his executive power and upon solemn
occasions.
S.D. Const. art. V, § 5.

